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Abstract
Based on an ongoing attempt to integrate Natural Language instructions with human
 gure animation we demonstrate that agents understanding and use of instructions can
complement what they can derive from the environment in which they act We focus on
two attitudes that contribute to agents behavior  their intentions and their expectations
 and shown how Natural Language instructions contribute to such attitudes in ways that
complement the environment We also show that instructions can require more than one
context of interpretation and thus that agents understanding of instructions can evolve as
their activity progresses A signi cant consequence is that Natural Language understanding
in the context of behavior cannot simply be treated as front end processing but rather
must be integrated more deeply into the processes that guide an agents behavior and
respond to its perceptions
  Introduction
This is a short position paper on what we have learned about language  behavior and the
environment from an ongoing attempt to use Natural Language instructions to guide the task
related behavior of animated human gures While the project  AnimNL for Animation and
Natural Language is not yet ready to deliver a prototype  we believe that what we have so far
learned from this attempt to produce a complete vertical integration from language to animated
behavior will be of interest and benet to others as well
AnimNL builds upon the JackTM animation system developed at the University of Pennsyl
vanias Computer Graphics Research Laboratory In Jack  animation follows from modelbased
 The authors would like to thank Brett Achorn  Breck Baldwin  Welton Becket  Moon Jung  Michael White 
and Xinmin Zhao  all of whom have contributed greatly to the current version of AnimNL We would also like
to thank Phil Agre  Joseph Rosenzweig  Jerey Siskind  Mark Steedman  Michael White  and two anonymous
reviewers for their comments on the many drafts this paper has gone through The research has been partially
supported by ARO Grant DAALC including participation by the US Army Research Laboratory
	Aberdeen
  Natick Laboratory  and the Institute for Simulation and Training US Air Force DEPTH contract
through Hughes Missile Systems FC DMSO through the University of Iowa National Defense
Science and EngineeringGraduate Fellowship in Computer ScienceDAALG NSF Grant IRI 
CISE Grant CDA  and Instrumentationand Laboratory ImprovementProgramGrant USE  and
DARPA grant NJ
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 Animated Jack Agent
simulation of virtual agents acting in an environment The agents of primary interest are Jacks
biomechanically reasonable and anthropometricallyscaled human models see Figure 	 The
models have 	 joints  including an accurate torso  and a growing repertoire of naturalistic
behaviors such as walking  stepping  looking  reaching  turning  grasping  strengthbased lifting 
and both obstacle and selfcollision avoidance  Each of these behaviors is environmentally
reactive That is  incremental computation is able to adjust an agents performance to the situ
ation  as the situation progresses  without further involvement of the higher level processes 	
unless an exceptional failure condition is signaled Dierent limits can be placed on an agents
vision  strength and comfort threshold  for more realistic environmental response  and dierent
environments can easily be constructed  so as to vary the situations in which the gures are
acting 
With these features  we believe that Jack can provide a fairly realistic target for linking
Natural Language with behavior This is because Jack agents naturally face limits on their
ability to understand Natural Language utterances  much as people do
 their ability to under
stand language relies on their knowledge  their knowledge is mediated by what they can perceive 
and their perception is limited Moreover  since Jack agents can  like people  eect changes on
their world  their understanding of language can evolve through intentional activity in the world
cf Section 
From our work with Jack  what we have been led to believe about language  behavior and
the environment is that
  Just as an agent may be motivated by its environment to consider adopting particular
goals as intentions that will guide it subsequent behavior  so an agent may also be moti
vated by Natural Language instructions Moreover  goals recognized as being situationally
relevant either through perceiving the environment or processing instructions  can clarify
the meaning of other instructions Human and Laird  see a similar complementarity
of roles between language and the environment in an agents acquisition of procedural
knowledge
  Just as an agent uses its perception of the current environment to augment its knowledge
and guide its current behavior  so too can an agent use expectations derived from instruc
tions about how a situation will evolve  to augment its beliefs and guide its current and
future behavior
 In discussing agents  we will use the pronoun he  since we will be using a male gure in our illustrated
example  ie  a gure with male body proportions The Jack animation system provides anthropometrically
sizable female gures as well

Intentions and expectations can complement one another Intentions can embody an agents
expectations that the agent can act in ways to satisfy those intentions  while expectations can
lead an agent to form intentions to check that those expectations are satised and to take
corrective actions if not
Three caveats are necessary here
 one involving the quality of everyday instructions  a second
involving the sources of an agents intentions  and a third involving the existence of a distinct
instructor
First  the task of formulating instructions is clearly not without problems for human language
users  as the prevalence of incomprehensible andor useless instructions shows Two of our own
favorites are

  Replace items on vehicle with items contained in this kit ANCO Replacement
WindshieldWasher Pump  Stock No 		
  To access the next highest programmed station setting  or to switch to a lower pro
grammed station  the SCAN buttons must be repeatedly pressed VCR  Mitsubishi
Electronics
There are many possible things to blame for the prevalance of poor instructions  including 	
the prevalence of poor writing  in general  a writers inability to be too specic  because
they lack detailed knowledge of the exact situation in which the task will be carried out and
 the diculty people have in converting narrative accounts of past behavior or experience
into eective instructions for future behavior Recall  for example  the joke about the bus rider
who asks a fellow passenger where he should get o for City Hall The latter replies  Just get
o one stop before I do
While signicant work is being done to improve the quality of instructions     	     
in the end  one may have to accept that no xed instruction set can serve all agents in all
situations
Secondly  real agents will always have additional intentions that come from sources other
than instructions
 intentions arise from personal goals and desires  as well as from the policies
social  governmental  etc an agent agrees to adhere to However  we have simplied the
situation to one of semiautonomous agents who have no other intentions than those that follow
from their given instructions This does not mean  however  that nothing else inuences their
behavior Since Jack agents are environmentally reactive  features in the changing environment
aect their behavior as well For example  an agent instructed to go to the door may also have
to take action to avoid obstacles it nds blocking its way In future work  we plan to address
instructions that convey general policy  and to allow it to aect agent behavior as well For
animated agent behavior that follows from particular personality traits  the reader is referred
to work by Bates et al    and by Morawetz 	
Thirdly  in real life there is often no distinct instructor around In the case of multiperson
tasks  this means the conduct of a task is often a product of negotiation by the participants 

each with their own knowledge and beliefs    The intentions and expections of any one of
them then may then reect what has been negotiated by the group We argue though that the
situation with a distinct instructor can show more simply that instructions can allow an agent
to form beliefs about the world that it can act on with relative condence
The paper is structured as follows
 in the next section  we discuss plans and instructions
in general  as well as some related work We also give a brief overview of AnimNL  in support
of the points we will be making about instructions  intentions and expectations Intentions are
then discussed in Section   and Expectations in Section 
 Background
  Plans and Instructions
Early views of Natural Language instructions corresponded to the early views of plans
 instruc
tions were treated as specifying nodes of a plan that  when completely expanded into primitive
action specications  would control agent behavior This view  for example  underlies SHRDLUs
successful response to instructions such as Pick up the green pyramid and put it in the box

That plans should not be viewed as control structures has already been well argued by Agre
and Chapman 	  Pollack   Suchman   and others in the eld Agre and Chapman show
that when people form plans in response to instructions  they appear to use those plans as
resources The actual task situation may then lead them to interpolate additional actions not
mentioned in the instructions  to replace actions specied in the instructions with other ones
that seem better suited to the situation  and to ground referring terms as a consequence of their
actions rather than as a precondition for them Other researchers  working in what has come
to be called a BDI framework beliefs  desires and intentions now view planning in terms of
agents adopting and dropping intentions to act 	  	    
A plans relationship with a set of instructions is also not rigid It depends  inter alia on
various features of the instructions  including

  whether the instructions convey doctrine general policy regarding behavior in some range
of situations or procedure actions to be taken now or at some specied time in the future
  in the case of procedural instructions  whether they are given before  during  or after action
  whether the instructions are meant as advice  suggestion  order  request  warning  or tuto 
rial
These features are apparent in recent work involving instructed agents For example  in Chap
mans work 	  instructions are given as advice to agents already engaged in an activity They
are treated as additional evidence for an action alternative already identied by the agent as be
ing relevant to the current situation That alternative may not  however  be taken immediately

or ever if other alternatives have more evidence in their favor Chapman derives this view
from observing how arcade game players follow instructions given to them by kibbitzers watch
ing them play Chapman also notes that negative instructions can be similarly understood as
evidence against actions
Vere and Bickmore treat most instructions to their basic agent  Homer  as orders to carry
out specic tasks  However  they have also enabled Homer to interpret negative instructions
as policy that can override orders that conict with it They give an example in which Homer
a small submarine is told not to leave its island  and it subsequently refuses to comply with
an instruction to take a picture of the Codsh a ship because to do so would require leaving
the island
Work by Alterman and his students  shows how instructions given after an incorrect action
has been performed are treated as assistance  helping agents to accommodate their existing
routines to the device currently at hand In this approach  routines evolved over many dierent
instances of engagement help focus an agent on the details of the situation that require attention
and on the decisions that must be made Instructions may interrupt activity to call attention
to other relevant details or decisions  or to correct decisions already made Neither plans nor
instructions function as control structures that determine the agents behavior
Our own work has focussed on procedural instructions given to agents before undertaking a
task Such intructions can be found in users manuals  owners manuals  maintenance manuals 
and how to books  for example 
  Depress door release button to open door and expose paper bag Royal CAN VACTM
Owners Manual  p 
  Remove safety wire from access unit adjusting bolt and adjusting link and loosen bolt Air
Force Manual TOIF	CJG  Ammunition Drum  Removal and Installation
  If candle wax falls on a piece of furniture  wait until it solidies  then pick it o with your
ngernail or a plastic spatula McGowan  DuBern  Home Repair London
 Dorling
Kindersley Ltd 		  p 
One application that could benet from the ability to understand and animate agent behavior
that would follow from such instructions is task analysis in connection with ComputerAided
Design By enabling virtual human agents to carry out maintenance and repair tasks in the
CAD environment itself  a designer could determine before the artifacts were built whether
people would be able to carry out those tasks in anticipated environments
There are at least three ways to make dierent virtual agents interact with objects in dierent
virtual environments One way is through direct manipulation  which would require a designer
to directly control a range of dierent agents in a range of dierent environments  in order
to observe and evaluate their behavior A second way is through direct motion sensing eg
Virtual Reality kinesthetic input  The third way is through Natural Language level

instructions This could be the most economical  since it would allow the designer to simply
rerun the same instructions with dierent agentenvironment pairs  in order to accomplish
the same ends
Other potential application areas for using instructions to direct the behavior of animated
agents include group training activities and multiagent simulations Thus we feel that enabling
virtual human agents to understand instructions is of practical as well as theoretical interest
   Overview of the AnimNL Architecture
We begin with a brief overview of the AnimNL architecture  since it captures our beliefs that
language understanding is a process that evolves  in part  through principled interaction with
the world Roughly speaking  AnimNL consists of three interacting modules

  A module consisting of processes that work towards understanding an instruction step in
terms of an initial structure of intentions  which we call a plan graph These processes
include parsing  interpretation and plan inference 	  	    	
  A module consisting of a highlevel incremental planner and two specialized processes able
to adapt highlyparameterized plans for search and for object manipulation to the exact
situation at hand         	
  A simulator that coordinates motion directives and perceptual requests from the planning
components with ones corresponding to environmental responses  and schedules their per
formance An agenda allows multiple behaviors to be carried out in parallel  and other
behaviors to be initiated and terminated asynchronously with respect to each other 	
The result is that an agents behavior at any time reects both its lowlevel responses to the cur
rent environment and the current state of its highlevel intentions A more detailed description
of the AnimNL architecture can be found in 
 Intentions from Instructions
Intentions have been identied as a factor in rational behavior by various researchers eg 
	  	  	    who see them as playing at least two roles
 	 they can constrain the courses
of action an agent need consider to those consistent with what the agent already plans to do and
 they can be used to determine when an action can be said to be relevant  to have succeeded
or to have failed
We have found that goals specied in instructions  which  in the case of positive instructions 
are goals that agents are being ordered or advised or requested to adopt as their intentions 
can also aect 	 how an agent interprets action descriptions in those instructions and  how
the agent behaves in carrying out actions In the rst case  instructions perform a role that
Chapmans PhD thesis 	 shows can also be performed by the environment In Chapmans

work  apparently underspecied instructions are interpreted simply as evidence for a response
to the current environment that has already been deemed relevant on the basis of perception
Therefore  if a knife can be used either to kill a monster or to jimmy a door  and if a monster
is threatening the agent and no door needs to be jimmied eg  to enable the agent to escape 
an instruction such as use the knife will be understood only as advice to kill the monster
In Section 	  we show how goals specied in Natural Language instructions can function
in a similar way  and in Section   we comment on how intentions derived from instructions
can aect lowlevel behavioral features We conclude in Section  with a brief discussion on
how the action representation used in AnimNL allows its highlevel planner to use intentions
eectively
 Behavioral Import of Purpose Clauses
Comments are often made about the eciency of Natural Language  how much of an utter
ances meaning can be left unspecied  to be lled in by listeners able to draw on an appropriate
context In this light  we have come to understand that purpose clauses  innitival clauses
that convey the goal of an action  provide a helpful source of information for understanding
underspecied action descriptions which convey information implicitly through context While
this information could of course be made explicit  people seem not to expect this
 speakers
commonly leave it for hearers to gure out for themselves
Consider the following example from 	

Place a plank between two ladders to make a simple scaold
The action description in the main clause is place a plank between two ladders The goal
conveyed in the purpose clause is make a simple scaold Now  by itself  the main clause
conveys no explicit constraints on the orientation of what have to be two stepladders and only
one constraint on the placement of the plank  that it be somewhere in the dimensional space
between wherever the stepladders are However there are signicant implicit constraints that
follow from the purpose of making a simple scaold
 the ladders should be aligned with their
treads facing outwards in opposite directions  at a distance spannable by the plank  which should
be placed horizontally on treads of the two ladders that are the same height o the ground How
high o the ground will depend on the purpose of the scaold
 it is not determinable from the
given instruction alone An incremental plan can then be formulated to comply with both
the explicit and implicit contraints on the procedure and its intended result
There are  of course  other linguistic means of conveying purpose  free adjuncts   means clauses    
and even simple conjunction  Moreover  clauses that convey purpose do serve other functions as well  such
as making an action description easier to understand    or justifying why an action should be done  Our
point here is simply that any linguistic specication of goals 	purpose clauses being a clear example
 can serve 
like the environment  as the context in which an underspeci ed action description can be elaborated and thereby
correctly understood

Our second example is intended to show that an agent can use a goal expression and percep
tual tests on when that goal is achieved to determine the referent of a noun phrase and hence
what action he or she is meant to carry out The instruction to be considered is

Vacuum the rug or carpet against the direction of the pile to leave it raised
To follow this instruction  an agent must know the direction referred to as against the direction
of the pile If the agent does not know the referent of this phrase before starting  the purpose
clause to leave it raised can be used to guide his or her search for it That is  the agent can
plan to vacuum a bit in various directions and observe which the direction of sweep leaves the
pile raised At this point  the agent can begin to elaborate a plan for vacuuming the entire rug
or carpet in that direction and thereby nish the job
A further example is related to a matter we return to in Section   and concerns the ter
mination conditions associated with perceptual tests The instructions are for removing wine
stains from a rug or carpet
Blot with clean tissues to remove any liquid still standing Sprinkle liberally with
salt to extract liquid that has soaked into the fabric Vacuum up the salt
In the rst sentence  blotting with clean tissues species a type of activity but not the extent
to which it should be pursued In the terminology of Moens and Steedman   it is simply
a process like running  not a culminated process like running a mile
 it has no intrinsic
endpoint How long an agent should blot the stained area comes from the purpose clause to
remove any liquid still standing
 the agent should plan to interleave blotting with perception 
until no standing liquid is left visible
The purpose clause in the second sentence conveys in a somewhat dierent way the condition
under which the agent can start the nal step  vacuuming up the salt It is not the termination
point of the sprinkling which is terminated when the agent decides there is now a liberal
amount of salt on the stain   but that of the subsequent waiting How long the agent should
wait comes from the purpose clause to extract liquid that has soaked into the fabric The
agent must plan to interleave waiting with perception  continuing until he perceives that the
salt is damp ie  a change in visual texture At this point  the salt has extracted as much
liquid as it can  and the agent can commence vacuuming
This example illustrates the complementary relation between intention and expectation
 the
intention to remove the standing liquid leads to an expectation that blotting it will eventually
accomplish this removal  which in turn leads to an intention to observe the situation  monitoring
for the expected point at which no liquid will be left standing
To say the above is not to say that an agents only intentions are those derived from instruc
tions  but rather that goals specied in instructions  which the agent may adopt as intentions 
can provide a context for fully understanding underspecied action description in instructions
Di Eugenio has designed and implemented the machinery to be used in AnimNL for com
puting many of the inferences that follow from understanding that the action   described in

the main clause of an utterance is being done for the purpose  described in a purpose clause
This relationship between   and  can be characterized more specically as either generation or
enablement In generation  executing   under appropriate circumstances is all that is required
to achieve  In enablement    brings about circumstances in which  can be generated by
subsequent actions
Di Eugenios approach makes use of both linguistic knowledge and planning knowledge A
knowledge base of plan schemata or recipes complements a taxonomic structure of action
descriptions The latter is represented in Classic 		 and exploits classication to allow an
inference algorithm to nd related action descriptions These descriptions index into the knowl
edge base of recipes which includes information about generation  enablement and substructure
relationships between actions The inference algorithms on these linked structures are described
in detail in 	  	
An instruction may convey to the agent that a generation or enablement relationship holds
between two actions  without the agent being able to determine which one  from the text alone
This may lead to confusion when the agent comes to act on the instruction For example  recall
the Royal CAN VAC instruction given in Section 	

Depress door release button to open door and expose paper bag
This is from a procedure for replacing the dust bag when it is full Whether a generation
or enablement relation holds between depressing the button and opening the door will
depend simply on the orientation of the canister If the canister is horizontal when the button
is depressed and the catch released  the door will fall open of its own accord because of gravity
In this case  depressing the button will generate opening the door  without the need for further
action If however  the agent has upended the canister to make the button more accessible 
depressing the button will just release the catch
 the agent must still grasp the door and pull it
open An agent who expected the former may think he didnt press the button hard enough and
try again  rather than think an additional action was called for Although this is a relatively
trivial example  readers will probably recognize the problem It could be solved by making the
instruction more specic

Holding canister horizontally  depress door release button to open door and expose
paper bag
However  making the text longer seems to decrease the likelihood that it will be read Trying
to convey the information graphically  relies on the reader distinguishing between necessary
features of the depicted scene and accidental ones This suggests that producing instructions of
guaranteed reliability may be an impossible task
  Intentions and Behavioral Features
In the previous section  we distinguished two relations  generation and enablement  holding
between an action and its current purpose Viewing purpose in terms of an agents intention to

achieve it  we now discuss the need we have discovered  to take account of that intention when
computing lowlevel features of the action to be performed and animated Such features may
include the place at which the agent locates itself to perform the action  and the manner in
which it grasps an object involved in the action or moves it While our current implementation
of this capability is simply via table lookup  a more general and extensible solution is being
pursued  for a wide class of object manipulation tasks In the meanwhile  we believe it is
still worthwhile to illustrate the phenomenon  if only by example  since such a dierence can be
made to human gure animation by a gures carrying out a taskrelated action naturally 
even when particular behavioral choices are not necessary to simply the success of the specied
action
Our rst example involves the region in which an object will be grasped If a hammer is
to be grasped simply to enable it to be moved from place to place  any region of the hammer
is a viable grasp location  although somewhere near its center of mass may make it easier for
the agent to lift and transport If however  the hammer is to be grasped to enable its use in
hammering a nail  a more appropriate grasp region would be towards the end of its shank Even
then  reorientation may be required  once the hammer is lifted
Our second example involves constraints on an agents target in moving to a location Con
sider the simple instruction
Go over to the mirror
By itself  this tells an agent little about where he or she is supposed to end up being positioned
with respect to the mirror On the other hand  specifying a goal that will be enabled by reaching
a target location can help an agent to better identify that location For example 
Go over to the mirror and straighten it
Go over to the mirror and straighten your bow tie
Straightening a mirror requires manipulating it  so an agent will target a comfortable arms
reach Straightening ones bow tie requires seeing oneself clearly
 this may target a location
either closer to or further away from the mirror  depending on the agents eyesight Note that
the instructor may not know enough about the agent to specify a target location in more detail

it is something that only the agent can determine Thus no further explicit guidance can be
provided
The capabilities of our existing implementation are demonstrated in an animated simulation
of SodaJack  a soda fountain agent who can respond to requests for a soda or ice cream 
In this domain  the intention to perform a basic task action such as moving a glass so as to
generate serving it to a customer  posts a constraint on the agents movements that the glass
not be tipped to one side On the other hand  moving a glass so as to enable wiping it o posts
no such constraint While a few simple things such as these can be done by table lookup  the
These are examples of purposive and  mentioned earlier in footnote  and discussed in more detail in 
The and form sounds more natural here than the to form
	
problem of systematically characterizing those features of intended actions that aect lowlevel
physical activity is of considerable diculty While the signicance of this boundary between
symbol and action has been recognized and formalized in   much more work is needed in
order to actually cross it
 Intentions in MeansEnd Reasoning
Given that instructions only convey certain features of an agents behavior  situated decision
making is necessary to expand and amplify the agents intentions  to ll in gaps To enable
decision making to use an agents intentions eectively  we have found it worth replacing xed
set of preconditions  with reasoning about the eects of actions in the context in which they will
be performed
This reects our analysis of preconditions  as encoding claims about the universal desir
ability or undesirability of certain eects of an action For example  failing to clear o a block
before picking it up  may mean that objects on top of it will slide o and break or disturb other
objects Sometimes an agent will be concerned about this possibility other times  not We
assume that agents may desire to avoid particular actions or actions that may lead to particular
states The problem with xed preconditions is that they prevent an agent from considering
an action  even if the agent doesnt care about its possibly destructive sideeects
Limited simulation  on the other hand  can enable an agent to reason roughly about the
eects of performing an action in a given world state The agent can then decide whether or not
performing the action will satisfy his intentions without violating any behavioral constraints In
some cases  the consequences will be acceptable given the agents current intentions  in other
cases  they wont This use of situated reasoning through limited simulation allows the system
to use intentions to dene  in a situationspecic way  when an action is applicable and can
be successful rather than using an a priori denition Another use of limited simulation in
planning are discussed in 
The removal of preconditions from action operators has multiple eects One benet is to
give the system more exibility in choosing which actions to use to achieve its ends However 
the cost of this increased exibility is that actions may fail to achieve these ends In short  using
intentions and limited simulation to perform action selection means the possibility of action
failure must be allowed for
The current version of AnimNLs planner  which eliminates preconditions in favor of situated
reasoning about the eects of actions  is described in more detail in   
 Expectations from Instructions
Here we address the role of instructions in raising expectations that complement an agents cur
rent perceptions in inuencing its behavior Expectations can lead to further perceptual activity
 not just observation but also activities that enable observation As such  expectations from
		
instructions complement the signals coming in from the outside world Here we discuss three
types of expectations generated by dierent elements in instruction  and the active perception
 they can engender
 Expectations about Processes
In some earlier work designed for creating animations from recipes  Karlin  analysed a
range of temporal and frequency adverbs found in instructions One particular construction she
analysed is the following

Do   for duration or until event
eg Steam two minutes or until mussels open
Karlin notes that this is not a case of logical disjunction  where the agent can choose which
disjunct to follow
 rather  the explicit duration suggests the usual amount of time that it will
take to just cook the mussels This can be detected when all the mussels that were closed when
they were put into the pot already open ones having been discarded as dead are now open If
they are not open after two minutes  the agent should wait a bit longer Those that have not
opened after another short wait should then be discarded  since they are full of mud
The usefulness of an expectation such as this comes from the cost of sensing Steaming is
usually done in a closed  opaque cooking pot  so the lid must be removed in order to check
the state of the contents Whenever this is done  steam escapes  setting the process back The
result of sensing too often then is that the mussels become tough through overcooking The
expectation can therefore be used to gauge how long to wait before beginning to make costly
sensing tests
  Expectations about Consequences
Processes often have more than one possible outcome  depending on how long they proceed
and how much resources they consume Another type of expectation arising from instructions
concerns the properties of objects that will result from such processes This is described in
more detail in 	
Consider for example  mixing our  butter and water Depending on the relative amounts
of these three ingredients and the absorbency of the our dierent for dierent types of our
and for winter and summer wheat  the result may be anything from a akey mass to a viscous
batter Instructions can indicate the intended result  so that the agent can modify andor
augment his actions so as to produce it How instructions convey the intended result can vary

In Example 	ac  the expected viscosity of the resulting mixture is conveyed through the verb

This is not something we are capable of animating without simulating the properties of semiviscous uids 
but it is the best example for making our point
	
	a Mix the our  butter and water  and knead until smooth and shiny
b Mix the our  butter and water  and spread over the blueberries
c Mix the our  butter and water  and stir until all lumps are gone
while in Example ab  it is conveyed through the noun phrase

a Mix the our  butter and water Let the dough relax for 	 minutes
b Mix the our  butter and water Let the batter sit for 	 minutes
There are several ways in which expectations such as these can aect an agents behavior The
simplest is to monitor the result
 if it doesnt meet the agents expectation too liquid or too
solid  the agent can compensate with additional amounts of our in the former case or water
in the latter Alternatively  the agent can monitor the process
 that is  he can add the specied
amount of water to the specied amounts of butter and our gradually  mixing it in If it is
becoming too viscous  he can stop before adding all the ingredients
 Expectations about Locations
Actions can eect changes in the world that alter what an agent can perceive Part of an
agents cognitive task in understanding instructions is therefore to determine for each referring
expression  the perceptual context in which the agent is meant to nd or ground its referent
Some referring expressions in an instruction may be intended to refer to objects in the currently
perceivable situation  while others may be intended to refer to objects that only appear ie 
come into existence or become perceivable as a consequence of carrying out an action specied
in the instruction
The dierence can be seen by comparing the following two instructions
a Go into Freds oce and get me the red le folder
b Go into Freds oce and rele the red le folder
At issue is the referent of the expression the red le folder In a  it is clearly the red le
folder that the listener will nd in Freds oce  a le folder whose existence the listener may
previously have not been aware of That is  a leads a listener to develop the expectation that
after they perform the initial action and go into Freds oce  they will be in a context in which
it makes sense to determine the referent of the red le folder In contrast  given instruction
b  it is reasonable for a listener to rst try to ground the red le folder in the context
in which the instruction is given If successful  the listener can then go into Freds oce and
rele it If unsuccessful though  a listener will not just take the instruction to be infelicitous as
they would in the case of an instruction like Pick up the le folder  if there were currently
no le folder around Rather they will adopt the same locational expectation as in the rst
example  that the red le folder is in Freds oce What is especially interesting is the strength
of this expectation
 a cooperative agent will look around  if an object isnt where they expect
it to be until they nd it This has led Moore to develop exible procedures he calls search
	
plans 	 following   that can be used to guide an agent in grounding both denite and
indenite referring expressions Moores search plans are able to incorporate expectations about
the context in which a referring expression will receive its intended grounding  to limit search
In AnimNL  Di Eugenio has attempted to derive some of these expectations through plan
inference techniques described in more detail in 	   In this case  the inferences are of the
form
 if one goes to place  for the purpose of doing action    then expect to do   at  If  
has among its applicability conditions  conditions that must hold for   to make sense  in terms
of its potential for success in the circumstances       that one or more of its argument
be at its performance site   then a locational expectation develops as in a If not  a weaker
expectation arises  as in b Notice that this can even arise on the basis of a single clause

Bring me the red le folder from downstairs leads to a similar expectation as a  while
Give the man downstairs the red le folder leads to a similar expectation as b Haas 	 
citing examples such as Pick up the book behind you  points out a problem with indexical
descriptions such as the book behind you A listener must decide whether such descriptions
are to be grounded before they act  in this case  so that it makes sense to turn around to see
the book in order to pick it up  or whether they must act on the description as given
In addition to expectations concerning the location of an object satisfying a particular de
scription  an agent may also develop expectations concerning the particular description that
needs to be satised Here  an instruction like Open the paint can is more illustrative than
Get the book An agent who simply seeks to ground the expression the paint can in its
current situation may identify several objects of type paint can On the other hand  an agent
who expects to be able to open the referent of the paint can will seek to ground a more specic
expression such as the closed paint can or the paint can that needs opening
 Conclusion
The central theme of this special issue is principled characterizations of agentenvironment
interactions What we have tried to characterize in this short position paper are ways in which
agents understanding and use of instructions can complement what they can derive from the
environment in which they act  lessons we have learned from attempting a complete vertical
integration from Natural Language instructions to animated human gures We have focussed
on two attitudes that contribute to agents behavior  their intentions and their expectations 
and shown how Natural Language in the form of instructions provides a source of such attitudes
in ways that complement the environment We have also made the point that instructions can
require more than one context of interpretation Thus agents understanding of instructions will
evolve as their activity progresses Understanding instructions is thus not a oneshot process
This is similar  in some ways  to Haddocks the rabbit in the hat example  in which the phrase as a
whole may refer uniquely in a context  even though neither of its component noun phrases 	the rabbit and
the hat
 do Haddocks solution makes use of constraint satisfaction  the in relation constraining possible
rabbit referents to ones that are in hats and possible hat referents to ones that contain rabbits
	
that occurs entirely prior to activity Language understanding is not just something that takes
place at the front end
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